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Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of 
national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three 
different groups—the Committee on Capital Market Regulation,1 the 
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st 
Century,2 and McKinsey & Company.3 Each of the reports focuses on a 
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 1. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006) [hereinafter 
COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim 
_ReportREV2.pdf. The Committee is sometimes referred to as the “Paulson Committee,” 
reflecting the name of its onetime chair, Henry M. Paulson. Paulson, former Chairman of 
Goldman Sachs, was the major stimulus for the Committee’s formation and the direction of its 
efforts, but withdrew from the Committee upon being appointed U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. 
 2. COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) [hereinafter CHAMBER REPORT], available at 
http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com (under “March 2007” heading, select “Download the 
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single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. 
capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. 
While the reports target multiple regulatory forces in their calls for 
reform, each report singles out securities class actions as one of the 
prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive 
disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant 
changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly, 
these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the 
not-too-distant past. 
Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).4 Among 
the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which 
the court chooses a lead plaintiff for the class.5 The statute commands 
that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a 
consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed 
to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the “lead plaintiff” provision 
supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s 
plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness the plaintiff’s 
economic self-interest for the suit’s prosecution. Also, by eliminating 
the race to file first, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair 
trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel, which Congress 
believed too frequently gave rise to weak causes of action surviving 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.6 The PSLRA also introduced for 
 
full report”). This Commission is identified as “An Independent, Bipartisan Commission 
Established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.” Id. 
 3. MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 
LEADERSHIP (2007) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT], available at http://www.schumer. 
senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf. At 
the request of New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles E. 
Schumer, the New York Economic Development Corporation commissioned the consulting group, 
McKinsey and Company, to prepare a report in order to provide a better understanding of the 
contribution the financial services industry makes to the economy and the forces that contribute 
to vibrant, competitive financial markets. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (codified in scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.). 
 5. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(i)(I)-(II), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(i)(I)-(II) 
(2000) (providing that within twenty days after filing of complaint, notice shall be published 
inviting class members to petition the court to be designated as the suit’s lead plaintiff, and 
according sixty days for such petitions to be submitted). 
 6. This abuse is complemented by the PSLRA’s alteration of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to mandate that the presiding judge in all securities cases determine whether 
sanctions against any of the parties or their representatives should be imposed. See id. § 78u-
4(c)(1)-(2). The PSLRA’s innovation removes from the litigants themselves the initiative for 
imposing sanctions. The rationale for this move was that prior to the PSLRA, in the course of 
settlement, dynamics frequently caused parties involved to relinquish quietly their right to move 
for Rule 11 sanctions. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 521-23 (1997) (concluding that the PSLRA reforms overall, including the 
alteration of the mechanism for Rule 11 sanctions to be considered, was part of Congress’s focus 
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securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement,7 as well as 
a bar to the plaintiff from obtaining any discovery prior to the district 
court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss.8 By introducing 
the requirement that allegations involving fraud not only must be pled 
with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong 
inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside—albeit only for securities 
actions—the less demanding notice pleading requirement that has 
been a fixture of U.S. civil procedure for decades.9 
The PSLRA also introduced substantive changes to the law. 
With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced with 
proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is 
capped by the defendant’s relative degree of fault. 10  Similarly, 
contribution rights among co-violators are also based on the 
proportionate fault of each defendant.11 Three years after passing the 
PSLRA, Congress returned to the subject of abusive securities class 
actions by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(“SLUSA”). 12  This law was prompted by the aggressive efforts of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to bypass PSLRA limitations—most notably the bar 
to discovery and higher pleading requirement—by bringing suit in 
state court. 13  Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are 
exclusively the domain of the federal court. 
 
that the presiding courts are to become more aggressive in their supervision of securities class 
actions). 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring the plaintiff to “state with a particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”). This 
section was recently interpreted to mean that a “strong inference” is one that is “powerful or 
cogent” and is to be determined from all the facts set forth in the complaint, with inferences 
being drawn both for and against the allegations. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007). See generally James D. Cox et al., Does the Pleading Standard 
Matter in Securities Class Actions? Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of the Likely Impact of 
Tellabs (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (concluding that divergent 
interpretations of pleading standard that persisted before Tellabs likely will continue). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 9. What is typically required is “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), 
overruled on other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (explaining 
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits, not to introduce “a 
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive”). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f). Proportionate liability does not apply, however, in some instances, 
such as when there has been an adjudication of knowledge of the violation. 
 11. Id. § 78u-4(f)(8). 
 12. Id. § 78bb(f)(1). 
 13. See generally Richard Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of 
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998). However, SLUSA 
preempts even claims that could not have been brought under the federal securities laws, such as 
those brought by non-purchasers or non-sellers of securities. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
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In this Article, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and, more 
particularly, the impact of the type of lead plaintiff on the size of 
settlements in securities fraud class actions. We provide insight into 
whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the 
overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia 
that may explain why some suits settle for sums that are extremely 
small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, to the 
asset size of the defendant-company, and to other settlements in our 
sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.”  
Part I of this Article sets forth the contemporary debate 
surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In 
this Section, we present the insights advanced in the three prominent 
reports mentioned above, which focus on the competitiveness of U.S. 
capital markets. In Part II, we first provide descriptive statistics of 
our extensive data set and then use multivariate regression analysis 
to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely 
examine small settlements for clues as to whether they reflect 
evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy 
recommendations based on our analysis of the data. 
Our goals in this Article are more modest than the Committee 
Report, the Chamber Report, and the McKinsey Report, each of which 
called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed 
securities fraud settlements in order to determine whether the 
reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s 
important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think that it 
was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further 
cutbacks in private securities class actions so soon after the Act was 
passed. 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTIONS 
A. Recent Calls for Reform 
The premise of each of the three reports is that U.S. capital 
markets are losing, or have lost, their competitive edge over rival 
markets, most notably the London Stock Exchange. The metrics 
advanced to support the thesis are quite similar across the three 
reports. For example, the Committee Report emphasized the widely 
 
Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87-89 (2006) (sweeping into SLUSA claims that 
misrepresentations caused class members to retain their shares). 
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reported news account that twenty-four of the twenty-five largest 
initial public offerings (“IPOs”) in 2006 took place in markets outside 
the United States.14  Indeed, the Committee Report tracks a fairly 
steady decline in global IPOs occurring within the United States.15 On 
this point, the McKinsey Report notes that global IPOs taking place in 
the United States in 2006 were barely one-third the level they were in 
2001, while European exchanges saw a thirty-percent increase during 
this same period.16 The most notable gainers have been the London 
markets, which have seen their percentage of global IPOs increase 
18.2 percent over the past six years compared to 11.4 percent in the 
United States.17 
Echoing these concerns,18 the Chamber Report notes the steady 
decline since 1996 in the number of foreign companies choosing to list 
their securities in the United States, so that the U.S. market share of 
worldwide listings has decreased nineteen percent since 1997.19 And 
the McKinsey Report reflects where many of these IPOs are 
migrating—to Hong Kong, Singapore, and London.20 At the same time, 
the Chamber Report observes that, on close analysis during the first 
half of 2006, there were seventeen foreign issuers who could consider 
an IPO in the United States. Of those, eleven chose the United States, 
demonstrating that “the competitive position of the United States for 
in-play IPOs has not dramatically deteriorated . . . .”21 Singled out for 
special treatment is the relative attractiveness of London’s Alternative 
Investment Market (“AIM”), which is the quintessential regulation-lite 
market. Since 2001, 870 companies have listed on the AIM, compared 
to 526 on the NASDAQ market, and the trend has accelerated, with 
 
 14. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (noting, as well, that nine of the ten largest 
IPOs of 2006 prior to the report’s release occurred outside the United States). 
 15. See id. at 30 fig.I.6 (reflecting graphically the decline from fifty percent by value of IPOs 
occurring in the United States in 2000 to about eight percent in 2006). 
 16. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 43. 
 17. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC 
EQUITY MARKET 7 (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg. 
org/pdfs/The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf (detailing the slide in 
worldwide percentage of IPOs listed in the United States, the growth in the London markets 
against the world markets through 2006, and the steady increase in market share for IPOs in 
markets outside of the United States and London). 
 18. See, e.g., CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19. 
 19. Id. at 19. 
 20. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 47 Exhibit 10 (reporting post-2002 percent of IPO 
values holding steady at about ten percent across four exchange markets within the United 
States, but rising in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London). 
 21. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 20. 
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the AIM enjoying more than twice as many new listings as the 
NASDAQ since 2005.22 
The Committee Report advances a more interesting line of 
inquiry by considering the forces driving the growing “private equity” 
market.23 In this type of market, funds raised from institutions and 
wealthy individuals are employed skillfully in order to take public 
companies private or acquire private companies that otherwise would 
have considered public markets as the next step in their development. 
While in the past, investors reaped their gains when the private 
company ultimately undertook an IPO, the Committee Report points 
out that, since 2001, the numbers of private sales exits exceed the 
number of IPO exits by ten to one.24 Others have suggested that, in 
addition to the cost related to the greater transparency of being a 
public company,25 another consideration for being a private firm is the 
heightened exposure to litigation related to the disclosures that public 
companies must make. This is reflected in the data gathered in the 
McKinsey Report, in which surveyed executives stated that “the 
propensity toward litigation was the predominant problem” with the 
legal system.26 
Although each of the three reports credits securities class 
actions with contributing to the growing anti-competitiveness of U.S. 
capital markets, they disagree as to the appropriate remedy. The 
least-sweeping suggestions appear in the Chamber Report’s first 
recommendation that any recovery in a private suit should take into 
consideration sums recovered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) pursuant to its authority under Section 308 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”).27 This provision permits the SEC to 
direct to injured parties any monies recovered from fines and 
 
 22. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 50 (pointing out that during the first ten months of 
2006, total IPOs listed on Nasdaq raised about the same amount as IPOs listed on AIM, whereas 
as recent as 2004, IPOs listed on Nasdaq raised about four times the amount as those listed on 
AIM). 
 23. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-38. 
 24. Id. at 36 (reporting that in terms of value, the private equity exits from 2001 to 2005 
totaled $94.85 billion compared to $12.06 billion for IPO exits). 
 25. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 26 (referencing a study that explored the effects of 
increased regulation costs from SOX, Ehud Kamar et al., Going Private Decisions and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org. 
Research Papers, Paper No. C06-5, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=901769). 
 26. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 75. For example, sixty-three percent of respondents 
thought the United Kingdom had a less litigious culture compared to seventeen percent who felt 
the United States had a less litigious culture. Id. 
 27. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 88-90. 
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accompanying disgorgement remedies.28 The SEC has used this “Fair 
Fund” authority frequently since the enactment of SOX; the frequency 
of its use and the considerable sums sometimes directed to the Fair 
Fund are unlikely to have been overlooked by litigants. Indeed, any 
private settlement following such action by the SEC most assuredly 
was negotiated in the shadow of earlier SEC Fair Fund awards. 
What appears to be lurking behind this proposal is the 
observation that:  
From time to time, there is a case in which a private action is proceeding ahead of an 
SEC enforcement action. In these relatively infrequent situations, the Commission 
recommends that the SEC consider whether seeking postponement of the completion of 
the private settlement until after a Fair Fund is established would be beneficial . . . .29  
Our own investigation of settlements reveals that parallel SEC 
investigations and enforcement actions arise in only about seventeen 
percent of the private settlements included in our study data. We 
suspect that, in the great majority of these cases, the SEC action is 
concluded before the private action is settled. Thus, the Chamber 
Report’s recommendation cannot be expected to have an important 
impact on the overall conduct of securities class actions. 
More importantly, the Chamber Report’s second 
recommendation for reforming private litigation is that the scope of 
the definition of who can be a primary violator should not be expanded 
beyond the very conservative “bright-line” test adopted by the Second 
Circuit.30 An understanding of this recommendation begins with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank.31 The Court rejected aiding and abetting liability, holding that 
only those who “make” a false representation or “engage” in a 
manipulative act can be liable under the antifraud provision.32 After 
Central Bank, courts have grappled with the question of just how 
remote a party can be from the misrepresentation and still be liable. 
The most liberal construction of this inquiry is that which includes all 
who participate in a “scheme” to defraud as liable parties. 33  In 
contrast, the bright-line test holds responsible only those to whom the 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 89. 
 30. Id. at 90-92. 
 31. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 32. Id. at 177-78. 
 33. See, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that those who participate in “sham” transactions known to be carried out for the 
purpose of facilitating the release of false financial reports are primary participants), vacated 
and remanded, Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., No. 06-560, 2008 WL 
169406 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2008). 
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plaintiff can attribute the false statement, so a defendant who is not 
identified with the false representation but who has contributed 
mightily to it is excused of liability.34 Some greater clarity in this area 
was hoped for when the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether 
“scheme” liability exists after Central Bank.35 The Court’s decision in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, 36  however, provides no greater 
specification as to the contours for determining who is a primary 
participant. Nonetheless, its distinctly anti-private-suit rhetoric is 
sure to impact the lower courts. 
Reflecting the concerns that arose with the disappearance of 
Big Five accounting firm, Arthur Anderson, the Chamber Report joins 
the other reports in recognizing the need for serious consideration of 
capping auditor liability37—the fear is that a settlement or judgment 
of a significant sum could well cause a further thinning in the ranks of 
public accounting firms. To address this fear, the Chamber Report 
recommends that auditors be permitted to enter into binding 
arbitration clauses, so as to reduce the cost of litigation and 
presumably to provide a more cost-effective means for auditors to 
manage their litigation risks.38 
The reforms recommended in the McKinsey Report call for the 
SEC to use its rulemaking power to limit liability of foreign companies 
“to securities-related damages that are proportional to their degree of 
exposure to the U.S. Markets.” 39  Presumably this would exclude 
recovery by foreign investors for losses suffered in connection with 
declines in the issuer’s home market.40 The McKinsey Report, similar 
to the Chamber Report, embraces a cap on auditor liability.41 Its most 
novel and pervasive recommendation is to permit parties to appeal 
interlocutory judgments immediately.42 Finally, the McKinsey Report 
 
 34. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that an accounting firm that allegedly assured a company of the accuracy of certain financial 
information, despite knowledge to the contrary, was not a primary participant because it was not 
identified in the publication of the information). 
 35. See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting scheme liability), cert. granted sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007). 
 36. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, 2008 WL 123801 
(U.S. Jan. 15, 2008). 
 37. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 107-08. 
 38. Id. at 114. 
 39. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 102. 
 40. See id. (stating that “aggrieved plaintiffs” should still be able “to recover warranted 
damages”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 104. 
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calls for express authority allowing company charters to require the 
arbitration of shareholder claims.43 
The recommendations of the Committee Report are far 
reaching. The Committee Report calls on the SEC to eliminate 
through rulemaking numerous doctrinal uncertainties that surround 
the scope of the anti-fraud provision.44 These areas of uncertainty are 
broadly identified as “materiality,” “scienter,” and “reliance.” For 
example, the report identifies an existing circuit split regarding 
whether a fact, omitted or misstated initially, can be material if the 
announcement containing the omission or misstatement is 
accompanied by no detectable market response. Similarly, the 
Committee Report points to a circuit split regarding whether the 
pleading standard permits an allegation of recklessness to create a 
strong inference of fraud and calls for SEC clarification. The SEC also 
is asked to clarify the scope of the “fraud on the market” theory for 
establishing reliance, whereby a class of plaintiffs can rely generally 
on the integrity of the market rather than proving reliance on the 
misrepresentation itself. Similar to the Chamber Report’s concern, the 
Committee Report argues that “private damage awards should be 
offset by any Fair Funds collections” obtained by the SEC. The 
Committee Report also favors prohibiting attorneys from representing 
plaintiffs in securities class actions where the attorney directly or 
indirectly has contributed funds to the election campaign of the 
officials responsible for an investor’s (i.e., fund’s) decision to become a 
lead plaintiff. 
In the audit area, fearing the disappearance of another major 
accounting firm, the Committee Report recommends a cap on the 
liability of auditors.45 In response to the WorldCom litigation result, 
the Committee Report further recommends that good faith reliance by 
outside directors on audited financial statements be conclusive 
evidence of their due diligence, so that no section 11 liability will be 
imposed on the relying directors if the financial statements are 
materially misleading.46 In WorldCom,47 directors failed to have the 
case against them dismissed, 48  even though misrepresentations 
appeared in the audited financial statements for which the outside 
 
 43. Id. at 103. 
 44. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 80 (calling for the SEC to undertake a review of 
the elements of Rule 10b-5 using a “risk based” approach). For the relevant recommendations by 
the Committee, see id. at 80-84. 
 45. Id. at 88-89. 
 46. Id. at 91. 
 47. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 635. 
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directors would be liable only if they failed to establish that they “had 
no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe” the financial 
statements were misleading. 49  The court concluded that it was a 
question of fact whether the directors’ awareness that WorldCom 
enjoyed one of the most positive ratios of expenses to revenues was a 
“red flag” that would deprive the directors of this defense.50 
The most sweeping litigation reform proposed in the 
Committee Report calls for permitting public companies to opt out of 
the current court-based litigation system if their charters provide that 
shareholder disputes be addressed via some alternative dispute 
resolution procedure, such as arbitration. 51  The parallel for this 
approach is what has occurred in the realm of customer-broker 
disputes, which, since embraced by the Supreme Court,52 largely have 
ridded the federal court system of such disputes, substituting in their 
place the NASD-supervised arbitration process.53 Implementation of 
this recommendation likely would require the SEC to set aside its 
earlier position that substituting an ADR process for court-based 
litigation violates the securities laws anti-waiver provisions. 54 
However, even if the SEC does retreat from such a view, any ADR 
clause most certainly would face a serious challenge premised on the 
argument that the anti-waiver protections are personal and, therefore, 
cannot be set aside by the collective will of a majority of a company’s 
shareholders. 
Whether examined collectively or in isolation, the reforms 
proposed by the three reports do not suggest wholesale indictment of 
securities class actions. With the exception of the Committee Report’s 
calls for the SEC to undertake rulemaking to clarify issues involving 
materiality, scienter, and reliance and its recommendation that public 
companies be able to opt for ADR procedures, the proposals are hardly 
an indictment of the efficacy of the securities class action. Indeed, 
 
 49. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (2000). 
 50. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4193, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005) (holding that directors cannot rely on certified financial 
statements if there are red flags giving notice that such reliance is unwarranted). 
 51. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 109-12. 
 52. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987) (recognizing 
arbitration of Exchange Act customer complaints against brokers); see also Rodriquez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (overruling earlier precedent, Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), to permit arbitration of Securities Act customer claims against 
brokers). 
 53. For a study of inconsistencies of recent arbitration decisions with underlying legal 
principles, see Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order To 
Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005). 
 54. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 111. 
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none of the reports include any of the claims commonly made in the 
mid-nineties by proponents of the PSLRA that securities fraud actions 
were, on average, extortion devices in the hands of unscrupulous 
attorneys.55 Rather, each report is thin on data capturing problems 
that exist with contemporary securities class actions. Thus, if we were 
to consider only the contemporary reform proposals, we might well 
conclude that securities class actions are working reasonably well and 
are only in need of some minor tweaking. We seek to address 
empirically several questions that we believe are central to assessing 
whether reform of the securities class action is justified. 
B. Tensions Surrounding the Lead Plaintiff Provision 
Congress placed the plaintiff’s selection at a strategic position 
in its 1995 reform efforts. The goal was to provide, whenever possible, 
the suit with a real plaintiff whose economic self-interest would serve 
the class and likely the defendant corporation’s interests. The latter 
could occur by structuring any resulting settlement to include 
governance reforms that would benefit the defendant company’s 
stockholders in the years following the settlement. It also is possible 
that the vigilance of a significant holder of the defendant company’s 
shares would recommend to the court that the suit was improvidently 
filed. The former could occur in many ways, such as the lead plaintiff 
prevailing on the class’s counsel to obtain a larger settlement than the 
class’s counsel otherwise would have pursued and negotiating 
attorneys’ fees that not only provide incentives for the counsel to reap 
a large settlement but also lower the fees from what otherwise would 
be awarded. 
The plaintiffs’ law firms are not passive participants in the 
operation of the lead plaintiff provision. The PSLRA empowers the 
lead plaintiff to recommend to the court who should be designated as 
counsel for the class.56 In this way, the decision of selecting the suit’s 
 
 55. Testimony during the hearings preceding the passage of the PSLRA sometimes 
emphasized the extortionate nature of securities class actions. See, e.g., Private Litigation Under 
the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 12 (1993) (statement of Edward R. 
McCracken, President and CEO, Silicon Graphics) (noting that securities class actions frequently 
are filed upon a momentary price decline of ten percent or more and often result in a recovery of 
attorneys fees, but little else). Some commentators express similar skepticism. See, e.g., Joseph 
A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 742-43 (1995) (concluding that, among 
studied settlements, less than one fourth yielded settlements below $2 million, with an average 
of these settlements being about $1 million, such that “settlement values may often be less than 
avoided litigation costs”). 
 56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(v), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2000). 
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lead plaintiff ultimately decides who will be the suit’s counsel. It is, 
therefore, understandable that, since 1995, plaintiffs’ firms actively 
have recruited, and nurtured ongoing relationships with, institutional 
investors with an eye toward gaining their support in being chosen to 
represent the class. 
The PSLRA is clear that the lead plaintiff is presumed to be 
the party with the most significant loss as a consequence of the 
violation being litigated.57 A review of the legislative history reveals 
that Congress’s vision was focused exclusively on this party being an 
institutional investor.58 As the following descriptive statistics reveal, 
this vision has not been fulfilled, as the greatest number of securities 
class action settlements have as their plaintiff either an individual or 
a group of individuals, but not a financial institution. On a more 
hopeful note, we do find that in recent years there have been many 
more cases where a financial institution or other entity is the suit’s 
lead plaintiff. We speculate that, as experience was gained under the 
lead plaintiff provision, uncertainties regarding the costs and benefits 
of being a lead plaintiff disappeared, resulting in many more 
organizations willing to shoulder the task of being the suit’s lead 
plaintiff. 
Initially, institutional lead plaintiffs were a narrowly defined 
group, being almost entirely composed of public pension funds or labor 
pension funds. Over time, this group expanded to include other 
financial institutions, such as insurance companies, private 
investment entities including hedge funds, and, sporadically, mutual 
funds. There is a continuing practice of permitting groups of 
individuals to aggregate their claims, particularly when they share a 
pre-existing relationship. Serious doubts have been raised regarding 
whether aggregation is consistent with the PSLRA goal of providing a 
watchful and resourceful plaintiff for the suit.59 These doubts stem 
 
 57. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that petitioner 
with “largest financial interest in the relief” is to be appointed lead plaintiff). The theory behind 
the presumption is developed in Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the 
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 
104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2088-94 (1995) (detailing agency problems that can arise in class actions 
that lack a plaintiff with a sufficient economic interest in the suit’s prosecution). 
 58. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 
(repeatedly making references to expectations that “institutional investors” will step forward to 
become lead plaintiffs). 
 59. See, e.g., R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional 
Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1218-19 (1999) 
(asserting that “aggregation shifts control of securities fraud litigation from investors to their 
attorneys and . . . makes it less likely that institutional investors will be appointed as lead 
plaintiffs”). 
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from the concern that groups face serious collective action problems 
and the belief that the incentives to be watchful are no greater than 
those of the group’s member with the largest loss. Rounding out the 
range of lead plaintiffs are individuals, who, as observed earlier, 
represent the largest percentage of securities class actions. 
In this empirical investigation, we have two foci. First, we seek 
to better understand how well the lead plaintiff provision is operating. 
As discussed earlier, a key provision of the PSLRA was the adoption of 
a mechanism for the court to select the most adequate representative 
of the class. We expand on our earlier work on the operation of this 
provision by including in our analysis a substantial number of cases 
filed in more recent years. The more recent settlements are significant 
to understanding today’s securities class action; our data reflects that 
it took several years for the lead plaintiff provision to attract large 
numbers of competing petitioners. To this end, we compare 
institutional lead plaintiff cases initiated prior to 2002 with those 
initiated after 2001. By undertaking this bifurcation, we capture how 
the experience with this type of lead plaintiff has impacted 
settlements. Moreover, in this study, we seek to differentiate more 
closely among the types of entities that are selected as lead plaintiffs. 
Our second focus is to understand better the dynamics and 
variables associated with the “small settlement.” These are 
settlements that yield amounts not exceeding $2 million or $3 million, 
which in our sample represent 20.5 percent and 29.7 percent of the 
total number of settlements, respectively. In this part of the Article, 
we address the claim that securities class actions frequently involve 
“strike suits,” which are baseless actions sought for no greater purpose 
than to extort a settlement, most of which is diverted to the suit’s 
attorneys. In the end, our analysis of 773 settlements suggests several 
areas of inquiry that regulators and policymakers should consider if 
any review of securities class actions is to occur. Our analysis and 
recommendations are intended to contribute to the ongoing debate 
about how securities class actions serve their compensatory mission. 
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS’ IMPACT IN SECURITIES 
FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 
We begin by presenting some descriptive statistics for our 
sample and the main variables for which we have complete data. The 
data sample consists of 773 securities class actions settled from 1993 
through 2005. Pacer was our main source of information regarding the 
specific cases, such as the identity of the lead plaintiff, the filing and 
settlement dates, and the settlement amount. We used the SEC 
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Enforcement Releases and the Nexis electronic data base to ascertain 
whether there was a parallel SEC enforcement proceeding. For each 
case, we coded the lead plaintiff type. We are especially interested in 
institutional lead plaintiffs defined as financial institutions in the 
classic sense of an insurance company, bank, pension fund, mutual 
fund, endowment, or foundation. The institutional lead plaintiffs in 
our cases are mostly pension funds, either public pension funds or  
labor union pension funds. To examine their separate influence on 
securities settlement outcomes, we separate these types of institutions 
from a residual sub-group of “other institutions.” 
In addition, we obtained information on the defendant firms’ 
total assets (a proxy for the defendants’ sizes) immediately before the 
law suits from COMPUSTAT and any bankruptcy filings by the 
defendants before case settlement from the Bankruptcy Research 
Database maintained by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki of UCLA Law 
School. 
Our study required an estimation of provable losses suffered by 
the plaintiffs during class periods. These numbers were calculated in 
the same manner as in Cox & Thomas (2004).60 The provable loss ratio 
variable was calculated by scaling the actual cash settlements with 
the estimated provable losses. 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 sets forth the descriptive statistics for the sample used 
in our empirical analysis. Categories 1 and 3 comprise our 
institutional investor lead plaintiffs. They figure prominently in the 
sample as there are 113 settlements (17.9 percent of post-PSLRA 
settlements) that involve either an institution, or an institution and 
an individual, as the lead plaintiffs. The largest category of lead 
plaintiffs is the “Group of Individuals” classification. These constitute 
aggregations of individual lead plaintiffs that are selected collectively 
to lead the class. Single individuals and other types of entities are the 
remaining two important lead plaintiff categories. There is no lead 
plaintiff for the pre-PSLRA cases. 
 
 60. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: 
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 768 n.100 (2003) (calculating provable losses using the 
damage estimation model). 
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The second half of Table 1 provides a breakdown of the year the 
complaint was filed for all of the cases in our sample. About one-fifth 
of our cases were filed before the enactment of the PSLRA, about 
three-fifths were filed during the early post-PSLRA period, and the 
remaining cases were filed after 2001 in what we refer to as the 
mature post-PSLRA timeframe. The broad diversity in our sample 
permits us to examine changes that may have occurred in settlements 
and other aspects of securities fraud class action litigation over this 
extended timeframe. In particular, we can examine longitudinally any 
differences in institutional investor activity and effect. 
To understand better what type of institutional investors are 
involved as lead plaintiffs in the cases in our sample, Table 1A 
subdivides this group of institutional lead plaintiffs into three 
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categories: labor union pension funds, public pension funds, and the 
remaining institutions. We make this division in order to highlight 
any differences in behavior among these groups. Prior research has 
found some differences.61 
 
 
 
In Table 2, we examine settlement amounts by type of lead 
plaintiff. Settlement size is the best measure of the benefits of the case 
to the plaintiff class. While there is some controversy over whether the 
current measure of damages leads to a “circularity” problem,62 the 
beneficiaries of the settlement almost always would prefer larger 
settlements to smaller ones. The largest settlements arise in cases 
with institutional investor lead plaintiffs. For this group of 
settlements, we observe much larger mean and median levels than for 
any of the other lead plaintiff groups. Public pension funds have by far 
the largest mean recoveries, but their median recovery is lower than 
that of the labor union pension fund category. Single individual lead 
plaintiffs achieve the smallest settlement sizes. Significance tests 
suggest that both the difference in the mean and in the median 
between institutions and individuals are significant at the five-percent 
level, and that the difference between the mean for public pension 
funds and the mean for other types of institutions is also significant at 
 
 61. Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of 
Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 3 (St. John’s Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722. 
 62. See ANJAN V. THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY, U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1 
(2005), available at http://heartland.temp.siteexecutive.com/pdf/18331.pdf (finding that, due to 
significant holdings of public companies by well-diversified investors, securities class actions 
produce net benefits to investors in mergers and initial public offering settings, but not 
otherwise). 
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the five-percent level. On the other hand, the difference in the median 
between public pension funds and labor union pension funds is not 
significant.63 
 
 
Table 3 reports the length of the class period for cases in our 
sample by type of lead plaintiff. The length of the class period is a 
proxy for the number of defrauded investors: a longer class period 
generally means that more investors were harmed. 64  We see that 
 
 63. p-values for the t-statistics for testing equivalence in the mean between institutional 
lead plaintiffs and individual lead plaintiffs, and between institutional lead plaintiffs and groups 
of individual lead plaintiffs, are both 0.02. The p-value for the t-test for testing equivalence in the 
mean between public pension funds and labor union pension funds is 0.0001. All of these 
statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of equal mean. p-values in the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test are both <.0001 between institutional lead plaintiffs and individual lead plaintiffs, and 
between institutional lead plaintiffs and groups of individuals, and the p-value between public 
pension funds and labor union pension funds is 0.35. 
 64. The class period spans the time from the occurrence of the defendant’s illegal activity, 
which induced response from investors up to when the illegality of the activity was revealed to 
the public. Thus, only investors who bought shares during this period are deemed to have been 
induced by the defendant’s activity and are able to be members of the class. Therefore, the longer 
the class period, the larger the number of investors deemed to have been induced, and thus 
harmed, by the defendant’s activity. Harm is evidenced by the stock market drop after the 
revelation of the defendant’s illegal conduct. 
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settlements pursued by institutional lead plaintiffs have the longest 
class periods, although public pension funds have the lowest mean and 
median class period length of any of the institutional groups. This 
difference may reflect that public pension funds, more so than other 
categories of lead plaintiffs, cherry-pick the cases in which they seek 
to become lead plaintiffs, but we cannot be sure that this is the case. 
There are relatively minor variations among the other types of lead 
plaintiffs. Significance tests have confirmed these observations.65 
 
 
Using total assets (in millions of dollars) as a proxy for firm 
size, Table 4 presents data on the size of the defendant firms in our 
sample cases. Firm size may be important as a determinant of how 
much a defendant can afford to pay in damages in a settlement, as 
well as the magnitude of the losses caused by its reporting violation. 
 
 65. The differences in the mean class periods between labor union pension funds and 
individual lead plaintiffs and between labor union pension funds and groups of individuals are 
both significant at the five-percent level. The difference between means for labor union pension 
funds and public pension funds is significant at the ten-percent level. The difference in the 
median between institutions and individual lead plaintiffs (as well as between institutions and 
groups of individuals) and the difference between labor union pension funds and public pension 
funds are both significant at the five-percent level. 
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The most salient fact shown in this table is that institutional lead 
plaintiffs (in all categories) assume the lead plaintiff position in cases 
with much larger defendants than do other types of lead plaintiffs. We 
also see public pension funds are lead plaintiffs in cases against the 
largest defendants based on mean values, although not for median 
values. Single individuals and groups of individuals appear as lead 
plaintiffs in cases against the smallest defendants.66 
 
 
 
Using the model that we developed in an earlier paper, we 
estimate for each case in our sample the provable losses suffered by 
the class members.67 The estimated provable losses are a measure of 
 
 66. p-values in the t-test for the equivalence in the mean are: 0.07 between labor union 
pension funds and individuals, 0.001 between public pension funds and individuals, 0.02 
between other institutions and individuals, 0.02 between labor union pension funds and groups 
of individuals, 0.0003 between public pension funds and groups of individuals, and 0.005 
between other public institutions and groups of individuals. All of these numbers strongly reject 
the null hypothesis of equivalence in the mean. As for the median, the p-values for the Wilcoxon 
rank sum test z statistics are <.0001 between each type of institutional lead plaintiff and 
individuals, as well as between each type of institutional lead plaintiff and groups of individuals, 
again suggesting significant difference in the median. The median between labor union pension 
funds and public pension funds is not significant at five percent, with a p-value of 0.28. 
 67. Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 60. 
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the harm suffered by the plaintiff class as a result of the defendants’ 
alleged fraud. We present these numbers in Table 5. Once again, we 
see that institutions appear as lead plaintiffs in cases with the largest 
values, although neither labor union funds nor public pension funds 
appear in the highest-damage cases on average. Further, we see that 
individuals and groups of individuals act as lead plaintiffs in cases 
with the lowest estimated provable losses.68 
 
 
 
Our final set of descriptive statistics in Table 6 displays the 
ratio of the settlement amount to the estimated provable losses for the 
cases in our sample. This ratio can be understood as the percentage of 
losses recovered by the class. While the overall level of this value 
 
 68. Significance tests show that cases in which public pension funds or other institutions 
(exclusive of labor union pension funds) were the lead plaintiffs have significantly higher mean 
provable losses than cases in which individuals and groups of individuals were. In contrast, the 
difference is not significant at five-percent level between labor union pension funds and 
individual lead plaintiffs or groups of individuals. The difference between the mean for labor 
union pension funds and public pension funds is only significant at ten-percent level. The 
differences in the median between each institutional lead plaintiff type and individual lead 
plaintiffs, as well as between each institutional lead plaintiff type and groups of individuals, are 
highly significant, with p-values <.0001 across the board. The difference between the median of 
labor union pension funds and public pension funds is not significant. 
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depends heavily on the damage formula and related assumptions used 
in calculating provable losses, the relative levels of this number help 
us identify differences in lead plaintiffs’ effectiveness. Here we see 
that labor union funds and public pension funds are about average in 
terms of recovery percentages, while the “Other Institution” category 
is a laggard.69 
 
 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
Having described the main variables in the previous section, 
we now use multivariate analyses to examine the underlying 
relationships between several key variables. We are particularly 
interested in the determinants of the size of settlements in securities 
fraud litigation. In Table 7, we display the results of a least squares 
regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors with the 
 
 69. Although the differences in the mean recovery ratio between each type of institution 
and individuals (as well as groups of individuals) are not significant, the differences in the 
median between these groups are significant at five-percent or ten-percent levels. Among 
different institutional lead plaintiff types, labor union pension funds and public pension funds 
are shown to have significantly higher medians than other institutions. 
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dependent variable being log (settlement amount).70 The independent 
variables are log (provable losses), log (total assets), length of class 
period, a dummy variable for the presence of an SEC enforcement 
action, a bankruptcy dummy variable (to control for the potential 
effect of bankruptcy filing on settlement size), and two dummy 
variables for whether the case was filed in the 1996-2000 (early post-
PSLRA) time period or the 2001-2005 (mature post-PSLRA) time 
period. 
 
OLS Regressor Coefficient Standard Error*** Chi-sq Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 3.87 0.27 198.03  <.0001
Log (Provable Loss) 0.34 0.03 99.04**  <.0001
Log (Total Assets) 0.15 0.03 26.64**  <.0001
Log (Class Period) 0.04 0.05 0.88 0.35
SEC Dummy 0.33 0.10 10.40** 0.001
1996 - 2000 Period -0.05 0.09 0.28 0.60
2001 - 2005 Period -0.24 0.10 5.62** 0.02
Bankruptcy Dummy -0.11 0.19 0.34 0.56
Adj. R-sq: 0.47
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** Heteroscedasticity-consistent
Table 7
Determinants of Log(Settlement Amount)
 
 
 
Scrutinizing Table 7, we see that provable losses, total assets, 
and the presence of an SEC enforcement action are all positively and 
significantly related to the size of the settlement, which is consistent 
with earlier studies.71 However, the mature post-PSLRA dummy is 
negatively and significantly correlated with settlement size, 
suggesting that the dollar size of settlements has decreased in cases 
 
      70.    If the variance of the log (settlement amount) increases with the size of provable losses, 
then an ordinary least squares estimate could suffer from heteroscedasicity problems.  We 
correct for this potential problem by using heteroscedasticity-constant errors. 
 71. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? 
An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 
1630-32 (2006) (finding that provable losses are positively related to the settlement amount, and 
that the presence of institutional lead plaintiffs additionally increases the settlement amount, all 
other factors held constant). 
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filed in the mature post-PSLRA period.72 We also find that class period 
length and bankruptcy filing are not significant explanatory variables 
for settlement size.73 
We next examine the determinants of institutional investors’ 
decision to intervene as lead plaintiffs in the post-PSLRA period using 
a logit model. Earlier research found that prior to 2002, institutions 
were more likely to appear in cases with larger estimated provable 
losses, at firms with greater total assets, and where the SEC has 
undertaken enforcement actions.74 Table 8 presents our results for our 
sample, which includes cases filed during the post-2001 time period. 
 
 
 
We see that including the later time period does not affect how 
institutional investors select their cases: provable losses, the presence 
of an SEC enforcement action, and total assets are significant and 
positive. Each of these factors indicates that institutions are more 
likely to intervene as lead plaintiffs in cases with larger losses, a 
government enforcement action, and bigger defendants. However, the 
length of the class period is insignificant, although it did yield a 
positive sign. In estimations not shown, we find similar results using 
the provable loss ratio as the dependent variable and all of the same 
independent variables (with the exception of provable losses). We also 
try alternative specifications (not shown) of the model to include 
dummy variables in the post-2001 time period to see if there are any 
 
72.    We test for the significance of the differences in the coefficients between the 1996-2000 
period and the 2001-2006 period  and find a chi square statistic of 4.47, which is significant at 
less than the five-percent level.  
 73. The absence of significance for bankruptcy filings may stem from the use of D&O 
insurance policies as the principal method of funding securities class action settlements. 
 74. Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 71, at 1630. 
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changes in institutional investor behavior during the mature post-
PSLRA time period, but these additional variables are insignificant. 
We turn next to a very important policy question: whether the 
presence of an institutional lead plaintiff adds value for the investors 
by increasing settlement size. Researchers previously have found that 
the presence of an institutional investor does add value for cases filed 
prior to 2002.75 In this paper, we examine whether this relationship 
persists during the post-2001 time period. Given the much more 
widespread appearance of institutional investors in the post-2001 time 
period, it is possible that they are no longer adding value. Table 9 
displays these new results. In this table, the Institution Dummy 
variable indicates the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff. The 
New Era Dummy variable captures any effect for post-2001 cases in 
general, while the variable Institution*New Era is an interaction term 
of the Institution Dummy and the New Era Dummy designed to 
capture any additional effect of institutions on settlement amounts in 
cases settled after 2001. 
 
 
 
We find that the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff 
increases settlement size overall and that there is a slight but 
insignificant increase in settlement amount in the post-2001 period for 
institutional investors. We also see that settlement size is positively 
and significantly correlated with estimated provable losses, total 
 
 75. Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 71, at 1636; Perino, supra note 61, at 21-25. 
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assets, and the presence of an SEC enforcement action. The class 
period variable is insignificant, as is the dummy variable for post-2001 
settlements overall. 76  Thus, the variables found significant in the 
early years of the PSLRA’s enactment continue to be significant more 
recently. 
We are also interested in learning whether the type of 
institutional lead plaintiff matters. In Table 10 below, we include 
three different dummy variables, one for each type of institutional 
lead plaintiff. As control variables, we continue to include the same 
independent variables as in Table 9. 
 
 
The results show a positive and significant impact on 
settlement size from the presence of a public pension fund, or labor 
union fund, as lead plaintiff. However, the coefficient on the Public 
 
 76. When we run a similar regression using the ratio of settlement amount to provable 
losses as our dependent variable, but with the same set of independent variables (except for 
provable losses, which is now part of the dependent variable), we find negative and significant 
coefficients on the Log(total assets) and class period variables, and a positive and significant 
coefficient on the SEC dummy variable. This suggests that cases against larger firms and cases 
with a larger number of claimants pay out a small percentage of estimated losses. 
 Interestingly, none of the institutional investor variables are significant. We explore this 
result more fully infra note 77. 
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Pension Fund dummy variable is more than twice the size of that on 
labor union funds, indicating a greater effect from the presence of 
public pension funds. The Other Institutions variable is slightly 
negative and insignificant.77 
III. SMALL SETTLEMENTS: ARE THEY STRIKE SUITS? 
Another important issue for us is whether securities class 
action suits are frequently strike suits. We approach this question by 
focusing on those cases in our sample that led to small settlements. 
We define “small settlements” as cases where the settlement before 
deducting any attorneys’ fees or related litigation costs is below $2 
million; we also separately consider settlements falling between $2 
and $3 million. Table 11 below presents a breakdown of those cases for 
our sample.  
 
 
 
 77. We re-estimate this equation using the provable loss ratio as the dependent variable 
and the same set of independent variables (minus provable losses, to avoid problems in the 
estimation). We find that the public pension fund variable is positive and significant, the other 
pension fund variable is negative and significant, and the labor union pension fund variable is 
insignificant. This evidence is consistent with a hypothesis that public pension funds are doing 
the best job of increasing the percentage of losses recovered by the class. 
COX-THOMAS_PAGE 3/25/2008 9:37:45 AM 
2008] SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 381 
Roughly thirty percent of our sample cases involve cash 
settlements below $3 million. By far the largest portion of this group is 
cases where the lead plaintiff involves individuals, either singly or in a 
group; together, they constitute just over fifty percent of all post-
PSLRA settlements below $3 million. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Labor Union Pension Fund and Public Pension Fund 
lead plaintiff categories show the lowest percentage of small 
settlements in the sample. The remaining lead plaintiff types are 
fairly tightly grouped in the twenty-to-forty-percent range. 
In separate calculations, we examine whether there are any 
significant changes in the percentage of cases involving small 
settlements for the three time periods we are studying: pre-PSLRA, 
early post-PSLRA, and mature post-PSLRA. We see a slight decline in 
these percentages from the pre-PSLRA period to the early post-PSLRA 
period, followed by a rebound to somewhat higher levels in the mature 
post-PSLRA period, but with no obvious trend.78 Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that the 1995 reforms had any impact on the percentage of 
small settlements. 
Table 12 displays some further descriptive statistics for the 
small settlement cases. On average, we see that the median values in 
small settlement cases are statistically significantly shorter for class 
periods, occur at statistically significantly smaller firms, and have 
statistically significantly lower provable losses, but exhibit very 
similar provable loss ratios (which are not significantly different) than 
the median values for cases yielding settlements exceeding $ 3 million. 
We infer from this descriptive data that small settlements arise in 
small capitalization firms in which there are relatively few injured 
investors and, thus, low levels of provable losses. On the other hand, 
the resulting settlements appear to recoup roughly the same amount 
of investors’ losses as other cases relative to the sum lost by investors. 
We caution, however, that these are only descriptive data and that we 
need to examine them more completely using a more sophisticated 
statistical analysis. 
 
 
 78. Cases with settlements less than $3 million accounted for about thirty-five percent, 
twenty-six percent, and thirty-three percent of the total cases settled during the pre-PSLRA, the 
early post-PSLRA, and the mature post-PSLRA periods, respectively. 
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One final set of descriptive data relates to the time between the 
filing of the class action complaint and the settlement of the case. We 
hypothesize that strike suits are settled more quickly than 
meritorious actions because their value is easier to assess by each 
side. We therefore check to see if small settlements occur more rapidly 
than larger ones, as a separate indication of whether they are more 
likely to be strike suits. Table 13 shows that there are some 
differences in settlement speed, with smaller cases settling more 
rapidly. Roughly, cases that settle for less than $3 million are 
concluded three months earlier than cases yielding larger settlements. 
These differences are statistically significant for the median levels, 
although not for the means. 
 
 
 
 
We turn next to multivariate regression analysis to see if these 
patterns persist once we control for the effects of other variables. 
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Table 14 exhibits the results of our analysis for the determinants of 
the provable loss ratio—that is, our measure of what percentage of the 
investors’ damages is recovered in the settlement. We see that there is 
a strong negative significant relationship between the provable loss 
ratio and the firm’s total number of employees, our proxy for firm 
size.79 Most importantly, we see that our two dummy variables for 
small settlements are both strongly (and significantly) negatively 
correlated with the provable loss ratio. We interpret this finding as 
consistent with the claim that small settlements recover a lower 
percentage of investors’ losses. In short, these small settlement cases 
appear to exhibit the characteristics commonly associated with strike 
suits: small cash settlements that represent a small percentage of 
investors’ damages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, in an effort to shed some further light on these issues, 
we explore the factors that determine when a case will settle for a low 
amount. As we expected from the earlier descriptive statistics, higher 
levels of provable losses, larger firm size, and longer class periods all 
significantly reduce the likelihood of a small settlement. None of the 
other explanatory variables in the equation are significant. 
 
 
79.    We used log (number of employees) rather than log (total assets) to proxy for the size of the 
defendant corporation because the latter is highly correlated with provable loss and thus gives 
rise to the concern about the variable's correlation with the error term. The number of employees 
is a reasonable instrument for the size of the defendant corporation and is much less correlated 
with provable loss. This weaker correlation plus the usage of a ratio as the dependant variable in 
the regression (in which both numerator and denominator are scaled by firm size) eliminates our 
concern for any correlation between explanatory variables and the error term. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error    t - Statistics p - Value
Intercept -1.64 0.25 -6.67 <.0001
Log (Number of Employees) -0.21 0.03 -6.29** <.0001
SEC Dummy 0.16 0.17 0.92 0.36
Bankruptcy Dummy -0.04 0.23 -0.19 0.85
Settlement < $2 Million -0.37 0.19 -1.94** 0.05
$2 Million <= Settlement < $3 Million -0.48 0.24 -1.96** 0.05
** Significant at 5%.
Adj. R-sq: 0.09
n - 376
Table 14
Determinants of Log (Ratio of Settlement Amount to Provable Loss)
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These findings are consistent with the claim that cases against 
bigger firms with greater losses and longer class periods are less likely 
to result in small settlements. Surprisingly, the presence of an 
institutional investor, an SEC investigation, or a bankruptcy filing 
has no significant effect. In other words, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the presence of an institutional investor lead plaintiff 
has no effect on whether a small settlement occurs. This would seem 
inconsistent with the claim that institutional lead plaintiffs monitor 
settlements and discourage the continuance of strike suits. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One of the forces propelling the PLSRA’s enactment was the 
charge that the merits did not matter in the settlement of securities 
class actions.80 This charge was leveled in a widely celebrated article 
that examined six settlements that fell in a tight band of twenty to 
27.35 percent of the allowable recovery. 81  This claim is not only 
debunked here but flatly rejected by other studies that find that 
settlements range widely and that the strength of the complaint 
matters—likely a lot.82 Equally reassuring is that the law can have its 
 
 80. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 514-15 (1991) (finding that the settlement amounts in the 
sample cases generally could be predicted knowing only the number of shares sold in the offering 
and the stock price at the beginning and end of the class period). 
 81. Id. at 516-17. 
 82. See generally Cox, supra note 6, at 503-08 (reviewing some early evidence and studies 
that challenge the assertion that settlements are not impacted by the relative merits of the suit). 
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intended consequence. The lead plaintiff provision sought to attract 
institutions and others who have a significant stake in the litigation to 
become the suit’s plaintiff. Our findings not only reflect that nearly 
eighteen percent of securities class action settlements in suits 
initiated after the PSLRA are prosecuted by institutional plaintiffs of 
the type desired by Congress, but also, more importantly, that they 
add substantial value to the outcome. Moreover, we find that there is 
no important difference in outcome associated with the lead plaintiff 
being a public pension fund versus a labor pension fund. Thus, 
criticism sometimes levied at the relationship some plaintiff firms 
have with labor is not borne out by our data. Finally, our study also 
underscores the dramatic impact an SEC enforcement action has on 
the dynamics of settlements. If there is cause for disquiet it is that 
20.5 percent of our settlements are below $2 million and, when this 
group is examined, we find that its median settlement is half that 
ceiling level. Equally disturbing is that these cases are settled more 
quickly, involve smaller firms, have shorter class action periods, have 
significantly lower provable loss, and yield investors a lower recovery 
on their provable losses than do larger settlement cases. Our intuition 
is that these are cases focused on a single reporting event committed 
by what the attorneys believe to be a vulnerable prey: the smaller 
capitalized company. Nonetheless, there is cause here to be somewhat 
sanguine. Because this set represents only a distinct minority of the 
cases, we believe it hardly makes the case for wholesale reform of the 
securities class action. We also speculate that recent legal events—
such as the Supreme Court’s further tightening of the pleading 
requirement, 83  its requirement that factual pleadings allege that 
misrepresentation was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff class suffering a 
loss, and its substantial qualification of the class action being 
certifiable on the “fraud on the market” theory for causation84—are 
likely to have their most profound impact on this cohort of cases. In 
this light, the law well may have progressed in a direction to reduce 
further the possibility of strike or long-shot suits. If so, our data, 
although preceding each of these recent developments, nonetheless 
 
 83. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007) 
(holding that “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it 
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent”). 
 84. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005) (holding that a mere 
allegation that fraud inflated the price at which investors purchased is insufficient to establish 
loss causation; there must be an allegation of loss following disclosure of the true facts); In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a trial judge, 
before certifying a class action premised on a fraud on the market theory of causation, must find 
more likely than not that the security traded in a market that was efficient). 
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complements the concerns that produce these procedural and 
substantive developments, which shape the future course of securities 
class actions. In sum, our data and accompanying analysis provide 
reassurance that the PSLRA is working and likely working well. 
 
